Abstract. We analyze growth dynamics in an economy where a private good can be consumed as a substitute for a free access environmental good. In this context we show that environmental deterioration may be an engine of economic growth. To protect themselves against environmental deterioration, economic agents are forced to increase their labour supply to increase the production and consumption of the private good. This, in turn, further depletes the environmental good, leading economic agents to further increase their labour supply and private consumption and so on. This substitution process may give rise to self-enforcing growth dynamics characterized by a lack of correlation between capital accumulation and private consumption levels, on one side, and economic agents' welfare, on the other.
Introduction
Private goods can be consumed by individuals to defend themselves from the deterioration of environmental resources. Classic examples of these types of goods are water or air filters, mineral water, devices for protection from noise 3 pollution generated by industrial activities or urban traffic (for example, doubleglazing) and drugs to treat respiratory illnesses caused by air pollution. Certain consumption expenditures on the part of city dwellers are conditioned, at least in part, by defensive reasoning. Consider the choice of using a car as a means of transport, a choice which may be caused by air pollution: individuals who would have preferred to go by bicycle are forced to use their car because the air is unbreathable. The shortage of parks and areas where children can play without the constant supervision of adults imposes further consumption expenditures. The massive use of home entertainment by children is partly a result of the lack of such areas, of the degradation of the urban environment and of the need to protect children from the dangers of urban traffic. The shortage of green space can induce individuals to purchase an entrance ticket for a protected nature area or to spend money on a day out to find a place to enjoy nature and leisure activities. Another possible expenditure could be joining a gym, substituting physical activity in a park in the open air with exercise carried out in a sports centre.
However, these are only "textbook" examples; the literature of environmental economics suggests that the category of defensive environmental spending can be interpreted in a very broad manner, comprising a vast range of consumptions that derive in part from environmental degradation, but are not merely a response to it. The literature on this argument (see, e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] ) supports the idea that individuals may react to environmental deterioration in a great variety of ways. When the environment deteriorates, individuals are more incentivated to adopt consumption patterns based on the use of private goods rather than on the use of free access environmental goods: spending a day on an uncontaminated beach close to home can be more rewarding (and generally requires the consumption of a lesser quantity of private goods) than spending a day in town; nevertheless, the latter option becomes relatively more remunerative if the quality of the beach is compromised.
In this paper we analyze economic growth dynamics in an economy where there is an infinite number (a continuum) of identical economic agents, whose welfare depends on three goods: leisure, a free access environmental good and a private consumption good. Each agent produces the private good through his own work and accumulated (physical) capital. The private good can be consumed as a substitute for the environmental good and can be saved and accumulated as capital. The environmental good is deteriorated by the pollution caused by the average consumption activity of the private good in the economy.
At every instant of time each economic agent has to choose the allocation of his endowment of time between leisure and the production process of the private good and the allocation of the output between present consumption and accumulation of capital. Since the negative impact on the environmental good of each agent's consumption choice is negligible (agents being a continuum), he doesn't take this into account in his consumption choices.
In this context, by working harder, economic agents can consume more in the present and/or in the future (via accumulation of capital) and consequently can benefit from a better self-protection against environmental deterioration in the present and/or in the future. Thus, economic agents may react to the deterioration of the environmental good by increasing the production and consumption of private goods; by doing so, they cause a further depletion of the environmental resources, which can, in turn, force agents to further increase private consumption and accumulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main results of the paper, comparing them with those of related literature. Section 3 defines the model. Sections 4-9 analyze the dynamics. Section 10 outlines the conclusions.
Related literature
The mechanism of economic growth that we intend to analyze is based on the hypothesis that the consumption of the private good by each economic agent contributes to the depletion of the environmental good, and therefore generates a negative externality (in the model the agents do not take into consideration the negative impact of their choices on the environmental good) on the other agents. Consequently, in our model, defensive consumption choices may be classified as self-protective choices "transferring" the negative externalities to other individuals [9] ; that is, each victim of negative environmental externalities defends himself by implementing the defensive consumption which generates further negative externalities for other individuals.
This situation has been analyzed, in a static model, by Shogren and Crocker 5 [10] , who demonstrated that, in a context where individuals do not cooperate (i.e., they do not "internalize" the externalities), the outcome is a degree of selfprotection that exceeds the socially optimal level. It implies that, if the individuals protect themselves by consuming private goods, the expected outcome is an excess in the consumption of private goods.
Such analysis has been extended to a dynamic context in several works 1 ; Antoci and Bartolini [1, 2, 12] , have studied the dynamics of labor supply under the assumption of bounded rationality (i.e., agents don't have perfect foresight about the future evolution of state variables), neglecting the accumulation of capital; in particular, they have analyzed evolutionary games where individuals have to choose their labor efforts from among a finite number of options and where the better performing choices become widespread in the population of individuals at the expense of those that are less rewarding. The analysis of these models shows that economic dynamics can present two or more locally attracting fixed points characterized by an inverse correlation between labor effort (and private consumption level) and individuals' welfare.
Bartolini and Bonatti [3] assume perfect foresight and analyze a model without capital accumulation where economic agents choose their (identical) labor efforts from among a continuum of values. In this context, they obtain results which are analogous to those obtained in the above-mentioned evolutionary games, showing that such results do not depend on the bounded rationality assumption. [4] analyze a discrete time perfect foresight dynamic with capital accumulation; however, their model shows a single fixed point which is a saddle point. Their analysis limits itself to the sensitivity analysis of the fixed point with respect to the variations of the parameters of the model. The present work intends to contribute to this line of research by showing that, even in a model of capital accumulation and perfect foresight, there may exist multiplicity of fixed points and that there may be no correlation between private consumption and capital accumulation levels in such states and the welfare of the economic agents; fixed points with high consumption and accumulation levels can be Pareto-dominated by others characterized by lower levels. Furthermore the substitution process between environmental and produced goods may have effects on the stability of fixed points and may generate closed orbits; self-protection choices can produce indeterminacy, that is the existence of an infinite number of equilibrium orbits leading to the same (locally) attractive fixed point or periodic orbit. When indeterminacy occurs, given the initial values of the capital stock and the environmental good, the economy can reach the attracting fixed point (or the periodic orbit) by following an infinite number (a continuum) of growth paths, each characterized by different consumption patterns and welfare levels. Consequently, the economy may experience very different welfare situations 2 .
Bartolini and Bonatti
Starting from different initial values of the state variables, it can reach different fixed points (characterized by different welfare levels). Furthermore, when indeterminacy occurs, each fixed point (or periodic orbit) can be reached along an infinite number of possible orbits, each of them giving rise to possibly different welfare levels 3 .
Finally, there is a strand of literature (see, e.g., [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] ) that highlights other mechanisms according to which natural resources abundance may inhibit economic growth (for a review of this literature see [20] ). However, according to the mechanisms analyzed in the above-mentioned literature, economic growth always generates welfare improvements.
The model
There exists a large number (a continuum) of identical economic agents. Since all agents are identical, we can consider the choice process of a representative agent. We assume that, at each instant of time t, representative agent's welfare depends on three goods:
1. Leisure 1 − l(t), where l(t) is representative agent's labor input.
A free access (renewable) environmental good E(t).
3. A private good which can be consumed either as a substitute for the environmental good c 2 (t) , i.e., as a self-protection device against environmental deterioration, or in order to satisfy needs different from those satisfied by the environmental resource c 1 (t) .
We assume that the representative agent's decision problem is
where a, b, d, r, α, β, γ andĒ are strictly positive parameters, k(t) represents physical capital accumulated by the representative agent and l(t) is the representative agent's labor input;k andĖ denote the time derivatives of k and E.
The representative agent has to choose the functions c 1 (t), c 2 (t) and l(t) to maximize the integral in (1) . Note that, according to the (instantaneous) utility function ln c 1 +a ln(E +bc 2 )+d ln(1−l), an increase of substitutive consumption c 2 (t) compensates the negative effect deriving from a reduction of E(t).
Equation (3) describes the dynamics of E(t); note that the value of the parameterĒ can be interpreted as the endowment of the environmental good in the economy, i.e., the state variable E would reach such a value without the negative effect due to the average economy-wide consumptionc 1 +c 2 . The assumption that the renewable natural resource is depleted only by the consumption of the private good and not by the production of the same can be motivated by several real life examples; a paradigmatic example is that concerning the use of cars: the negative impact of their production process is negligible in comparison to the pollution generated by their daily use. This assumption is made for the sake of analytical simplicity. However, it is reasonable to suppose that the predictions of the model would be confirmed assuming that the production activity also depletes the environment; in fact, the self-enforcing nature of the substitution process described above, on which the results of the model are based, is fueled by the negative impact of economic activity on the environmental resource; the higher such impact, the greater the incentive to consume substitutes for the environmental good.
At each instant of time, the representative agent produces the quantity of output l α k 1−α Ω and, according to the equation (2) , the difference between the production l α k 1−α Ω and the consumption c 1 + c 2 is accumulated as productive capital.
In the production function l α k 1−α Ω, Ω represents a positive externality due to the economy-wide production activity. We assume that α < 1; so, with Ω constant, the production function exhibits a constant return-to-scale technology (i.e., it is a homogeneous function of degree 1). In accordance with the literature on economic growth with externalities (see, e.g., [13, 21] ), we model the positive externality as follows
where δ and ε are strictly positive parameters andl(t) andk(t) represent the average use of labor and capital in the economy, respectively. When the average capital or labor input goes up, the productivity of l and k grows in that Ω is increasing inl and ink. We assume that average values are considered as exogenously given by the representative agent when optimizing. This assumption is plausible in a context in which there is a very large number of agents (in particular, we have assumed that they are a continuum); so, each agent considers as negligible the impact that his own choices may have on the average values of economic variables. A consequence of this assumption is that the growth dynamics we shall analyze are not optimal; however, each growth path followed by the economy represents a Nash equilibrium; that is, no agent has an incentive to modify his choices if the choices of the others are fixed.
Since all agents are identical, they make the same choices; consequently, the average valuesc 1 (t),c 2 (t),l(t),k(t) coincide (ex post) with the values of c 1 (t), c 2 (t), l(t), k(t) chosen by the representative agent. Note that, by substitutinḡ l(t) = l(t) andk(t) = k(t) in the production function l α k 1−α Ω, we obtain the function l α+δ k 1−α+ε , i.e., the function that would be considered by a social planner who had the possibility of coordinating agents' choices. Such function exhibits decreasing (respectively, constant and increasing) marginal productivity of the labor input l if α + δ < 1 (respectively, α + δ = 1 and α + δ > 1); an analogous consideration holds for k and its exponent 1 − α + ε. For space constraints, we restrict our analysis here to the study of case ε < α; this assumption rules out the possibility of unbounded growth of k; the case ε ≥ α will be considered in a future study.
The Hamiltonian function for our problem is
where λ and θ are the co-state variables associated with k and E respectively. By applying the maximum principle we obtain that the dynamics of c 1 (t), c 2 (t), l(t), k(t), E(t) must satisfy the following conditions
wherec 1 ,c 2 ,l,k must be replaced by c 1 , c 2 , l, k in expressions (4)- (9) and the control variables c 1 , c 2 , l are determined by conditions (4)- (6) . Notice that, in our model the control variables c 1 and l are always strictly positive and l < 1.
We omit the dynamics of the co-state variable θ since equations (7)- (9) do not depend on it (precisely becausec 1 andc 2 are considered exogenous by the representative agent). Furthermore, we assume the usual transversality condition
which is satisfied by every orbit approaching a fixed point or a periodic orbit.
Dynamics with c 2 = 0
From (6) it follows that, if the condition
is met, then the representative agent chooses c 2 = 0; i.e., he doesn't consume the private good as a substitute for the environmental good. Otherwise, he chooses c 2 > 0. Condition (10) is satisfied if, given λ, the value of E is high enough. The dynamics with c 2 = 0 are analyzed in [22] , where the possibility of substitution between the private good and the environmental good is not considered. In this section, the basic analytical results of the said paper are illustrated. When c 2 = 0, system (7)- (9) is decoupled in the planar system given by (7) and (8) and the non-autonomous differential equation (9) . We can easily observe that at most one fixed point, say S ′ , exists, with the following coordinates
Such a fixed point exists only if (10) is satisfied, which requires, coeteris paribus, the endowment of the environmental good,Ē, to be sufficiently high and the negative impact, γ, of average consumption on the environmental good to be sufficiently low. The stability of the fixed point is described by Theorem 1. Let
Then: 
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(ii) If p < 0 and q > 0, S ′ is a saddle with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
(iii) If p < 0 and q < 0, S ′ is a sink.
If case (i) holds, given the initial values of k and E, there exists (at least locally) a single initial value of λ (determined by the representative agent) from which the economy approaches the fixed point.
Note that condition (i) is satisfied if α + δ ≤ 1, where α and δ are the exponents of l andl, respectively, in the production function.
The fixed point cannot be (generically) reached if (ii) holds. Vice versa, when (iii) is satisfied, given the initial values of k and E, there exists a continuum of initial values of λ leading to the fixed point. In other words there exist an infinite number of (Nash) equilibrium orbits that the economy may follow to reach the fixed point. Along each orbit no economic agent has an incentive to change his choices, given other agents' choices.
Observe that the parameters r (discount rate),Ē (endowment of the environmental good), γ (impact of average consumption on the environmental good) play a role in the existence of the fixed point (condition (10)), but don't affect its stability properties.
Theorem 2. When δ crosses the valuē
an attracting limit cycle (through a Hopf supercritical bifurcation) arises for δ >δ.
Proof. Proofs of the above theorems are given in [22] .
When an attracting orbit exists, by following such an orbit the economy may enter the region of the plane (λ, E) where c 2 > 0. However, this is not the case if the periodic orbit is small enough. Antoci, Brugnano and Galeotti [22] show, through numerical simulations, that the periodic orbit expands as the bifurcation parameter δ increases.
In the next section we analyze dynamics in the subset of the positive orthant of the space (k, λ, E) where condition (10) is not satisfied, and consequently economic agents consume the private good also as a substitute for the environmental good (i.e., c 2 > 0).
Fixed points in the regime c 2 > 0
It is easy to check that, in the regime c 2 > 0, there always exists a fixed point at which the environmental good is completely depleted, that is S = (k,
Denote by S = (k * , c * 1 , E * ) a fixed point satisfying the conditions E > 0 and
Theorem 3. S = (k * , c * 1 , E * ) is a fixed point satisfying the conditions E > 0 and c 2 > 0, if and only if
where
and, furtherly, k * ∈ (k 1 , k 2 ), k 1 and k 2 being determined by the intersections of the curveĒ = ψ(k * ) with the lines
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark. S is unique whenever
. So, from (11) , it follows that there exists at most one fixed point Fig. 3 ). Straightforward computations yield that the latter case holds, if and only if
Then, if (12) is verified, an interval (Ē l ,Ē u ) is given, with
such that for anyĒ ∈ (Ē l ,Ē u ) there exist two fixed points with a strictly positive E in the regime c 2 > 0.
Observe that condition (12) is never satisfied if coeteris paribus, the negative impact γ, on the environmental good of average consumption is high enough.
Figs. 1-3 illustrate the possible configurations of fixed points, in dependence of the parameters. With any point in the positiveĒ-axis being fixed (that is, given the endowment of the environmental good), the intersections between the horizontal straight line passing through it and the continuous lines drawn in each figure give the number of existing fixed points and the corresponding values of k * . Note that, in Figs. 1-3 , the fixed point with the lowest level of capital accumulation is the one with E > 0 and c 2 = 0 (when existing). Such a fixed point would be unique if the private good could not be consumed as a substitute for the environmental good. Fig. 1 illustrates the case σ ≤ γ (that is, the case where the negative impact on the environmental good of average consumption is sufficiently high). In such a case at most three fixed points can exist. If the endowmentĒ of the environmental good is high enough, then there exist two fixed points: the one with E = 0 and c 2 > 0 and the one with E > 0 and c 2 = 0. AsĒ decreases, then three fixed points appear: those with E = 0, c 2 > 0 and E > 0, c 2 = 0 and a fixed point where E > 0 and c 2 > 0. Finally, ifĒ is sufficiently low, then only the fixed point with E = 0 exists. Fig. 2 can be interpreted in a similar way. Unlike in Fig. 1 , at most two fixed points can coexist. Fig. 3 shows the more interesting case, where the highest number of fixed points can exist, i.e., one with E > 0 and c 2 = 0, two with E > 0 and c 2 > 0, one with E = 0 and c 2 > 0. Such a regime exists if, coeteris paribus,Ē and γ are not "too" high or "too" low. It is easy to check that at S = ( k, c 1 , 0) the E-axis is an eigenspace of the Jacobian matrix, whose associated eigenvalue has the sign ofĒ − ψ( k).
The stability of S as well as the dynamics in the invariant E = 0 plane can be reconducted to the projection on the (k,
Therefore, starting from a strictly positive value of E, the fixed point can be (generically) reached by suitably choosing λ ifĒ − ψ( k) < 0 is satisfied and Case 1 or Case 3 holds. In particular, when Case 3 holds, there exists a continuum of orbits approaching the fixed point, i.e., indeterminacy occurs. 
where A, B, and det J(S) are computed in Appendix B. We can distinguish the following subcases. Proof. See Appendices C and D.
Case
Remember that, in the production function of the representative agent, α is the exponent of labor input l and δ is the exponent of average labor inputl. The above theorem says that, if α + δ ≤ 1, then the fixed points in the regime E > 0 and c 2 > 0 cannot be attractive: that is, indeterminacy cannot occur.
Furthermore, if a fixed point satisfies ψ ′ (k * ) > 0, then it cannot be reached (generically) by the economy. If instead the condition ψ ′ (k * ) < 0 holds, then the fixed point has a bi-dimensional stable manifold (and can be reached by the economy) if k * is near enough to k 2 ; otherwise, it may be a repellor. In the latter case, such a fixed point might be "surrounded", via a Hopf bifurcation, by a periodic orbit with a bi-dimensional stable manifold.
Remember that, if α + δ ≤ 1, the fixed point S ′ in the c 2 = 0 regime (when existing) is always a saddle with a bi-dimensional stable manifold. If α + δ ≤ 1 and σ ≤ γ (see Fig. 1 ), the fixed point satisfying E > 0 and c 2 > 0 cannot be (generically) reached by the economy, being a saddle with a one-dimensional stable manifold. The fixed point with E = 0 cannot be reached (starting from a strictly positive value of E) ifĒ is high enough, that is, whenĒ > ψ(k * ) and the Jacobian matrix has a strictly positive eigenvalue in the E-axis direction.
Observe that both the fixed point with E = 0 and the one with c 2 = 0 can be saddles with bi-dimensional stable manifolds. In such a case a bi-stable dynamic regime occurs: the economy can approach either fixed point depending on the initial values of E and k.
Analogous observations can be made about Figs. 2 and 3. 
where H(S) is defined by formula (C.3).
In particular conditions (13) imply
and
where A and B are computed in Appendix B. From the expression of det J(S) (formula (B.1)) and from (14) it follows that ψ ′ (k * ) < 0 if S is an attractor.
Two subcases are then to be examined:
increases. Therefore (14) holds in a subinterval of (k 0 , k 2 ), if and only if it holds at the fixed point
Hence (16) 
For example, fixed α and δ so that α + δ > 1, the other parameters can be chosen to satisfy
Then, if α − ε > 0 is sufficiently small, the conditions
are seen to hold. Hence, when k * belongs to a suitable right neighborhood of k 0 , the corresponding fixed point S is attractive.
Subcase 2.
In such a case σ ≥ abβ + γ and
Hence (14) holds in a subinterval of (k 1 , k 2 ), if and only if it holds at k 1 .
Denote by S 1 the fixed point (k 1 , c 1 , E 1 ). We havē
Therefore, again, (14) implies (17) . Let us check, next, condition (15) . Exploiting (14) , through easy calculations, (15) implies
i.e., because of (18),
Letting J 1 = J(S 1 ) and writing the characteristic polynomial P 1 (λ) of J 1 , it follows that S is an attractor for k * belonging to a suitable right neighborhood of k 1 , if and only if
For example, let α + δ > 1, d satisfying (17) and (19), α − ε > 0 sufficiently small. Furthermore set
Then it can be checked that, when α − ε is small enough, for k * belonging to a suitable right neighborhood of k 1 , the corresponding fixed point S is an attractor.
Remark. Let S be the attractor of the example in Subcase 1. Then, for the same values of the parameters, two more fixed points with a positive E can exist, i.e.,
S ′ = (k ′ , c ′ 1 , E ′ ) in the c 2 = 0 regime and S ′′ = (k ′′ , c ′′ 1 , E ′′ ) in the c 2 > 0 regime, k ′′ ∈ (k 1 , k 0 ). Since (17) holds,
it follows:
(i) S ′ is either an attractor or a saddle with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
In fact, considering the above example, S ′ is an attractor when, for instance, both α and ε are sufficiently close to 1, while it can be a saddle when α and ε are themselves "small".
(ii) S ′′ is a saddle with a bi-dimensional stable manifold. Such a manifold is locally a separatrix.
Note that, when α + δ > 1, there is the possibility of three reachable fixed points; this case occurs if, for example, the fixed point in c 2 = 0 is attractive, the one with E > 0, c 2 > 0, ψ ′ (k * ) > 0 is a saddle with a bi-dimensional stable manifold and the fixed point satisfying E > 0, c 2 > 0, ψ ′ (k * ) < 0 is also attractive.
Welfare analysis: numerical examples
Through two numerical examples, we show that capital accumulation level (and, consequently, private consumption level) and economic agents' welfare may be not positively correlated; that is, economic agents' welfare at a fixed point with a high accumulation level can be lower than at a fixed point with a low accumulation level. Firstly, we assume: α = 0.8, β = 0.05, γ = 0.1, δ = 0.2, ε = 0.75, a = 2.5, b = 0.1, d = 0.05, r = 0.1; in Fig. 4 we represent capital accumulation values k * , evaluated at the fixed points A, B, C and D, as functions of the parameterĒ (remember thatĒ is the endowment of the natural resource in the economy). The context we consider is that of Fig. 3 , so, in the fixed point A it holds that c 2 = 0 (i.e., the private good is not consumed as a substitute for the environmental good) while in B, C and D we have c 2 > 0; among these, D is the fixed point where E = 0, that is where the natural resource is completely depleted. Reachable fixed points (i.e., those having at least two negative eigenvalues) are indicated by continuous lines, the others by dotted lines. Note that, for sufficiently low values ofĒ, only D is reachable; for sufficiently high values of E, only A is reachable; finally, for intermediate values ofĒ, both A and D are reachable. Therefore, as shown in the above analysis, our model predicts that a consequence of a reduction ofĒ (due, for example, to an exogenous shock) can be the convergence of the economy to a fixed point with a higher accumulation level.
In Fig. 4 we also represent the values assumed by the utility function U at the fixed points A, B, C and D, as functions of the parameterĒ. Observe that the highest utility value is obtained at the fixed point A with the lowest accumulation level; the opposite holds for the fixed point D where the highest accumulation level is associated with the lowest utility level.
In Fig. 5 we modify the preceding example by assuming (coeteris paribus) δ = 0.5. In Fig. 5a , we can see that only the fixed point D (respectively, only the fixed point A) is reachable ifĒ is low enough (respectively, ifĒ is high enough).
For intermediate values ofĒ, two fixed points are reachable: A and D or A and C. Note that the effects of an increase ofĒ on the values of k * at the reachable fixed points are similar to those of the former example; however, in the latter example, we can see that in D and C the utility function assumes values higher than in A; consequently, in this context, economic growth is desirable. These results are due to the fact that the productive activity of each agent also generates positive externalities on the productive activity of the others; consequently, the level of welfare obtained is the result of the interaction of both positive and negative effects deriving from the choices of each agent. In the former example, negative externalities overcome positive externalities; vice versa in the latter.
Hopf bifurcations
Our interest in the existence of periodic orbits is motivated by the fact that oscillations of the state variables k and E produce a reduction in welfare compared with a state of the economy where the values of k and E are equal to the time averages of k and E along the periodic orbit, if economic agents are risk-averse (see, e.g., [13] ).
The existence of periodic orbits in the c 2 = 0 regime was analyzed in [22] , where a supercritical Hopf bifurcation was shown to give rise to a locally attracting periodic orbit (i.e., with a three-dimensional stable manifold). Let us now investigate, in the c 2 > 0 regime, local bifurcations taking place at the equilibrium S = (k * , c * 1 , E * ), with E * > 0, when k * varies in (k 1 , k 2 ).
Case 1.
Assume α + δ ≤ 1 and S is a repellor for k * belonging to a sub-interval I of (k 1 , k 2 ). Then c * 1 k * is decreasing and ψ ′ (k * ) < 0 in I. It follows that, when k * approaches k 2 , generically a Hopf bifurcation occurs, as the real part of two complex conjugate eigenvalues turns from positive into negative. In other words, for k * belonging to a suitable left neighborhood of k 2 , S has a bi-dimensional stable and a one-dimensional unstable manifold. Case 2. Assume α + δ > 1 and S is an attractor for k * belonging to a sub-interval
Then ψ ′ (k * ) < 0 and
as conditions (14) and (15) are checked to imply.
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It is easily seen that k 4 = k 2 , if
In the latter case, when k * crosses k 4 , one real negative eigenvalue becomes positive, passing through ∞, and S has a bi-dimensional stable and a one-dimensional unstable manifold as k * ∈ (k 4 , k 2 ).
Furthermore it may happen that k 3 > k m , where k m = k 0 or k m = k 1 , in Cases 1 and 2, respectively.
If this occurs, then, generically, a Hopf bifurcation takes place when k * crosses k 3 , as S becomes an attractor from a saddle with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
Case 3. Consider the case
Then no bifurcation occurs in the possible interval J ⊆ (k 1 , k 2 ), where ψ ′ (k * ) < 0.
In such an interval S has a one-dimensional stable and a bi-dimensional unstable manifold.
If, furthermore, γ < σ < abβ + γ, then, passing through k 0 (recall ψ ′ (k 0 ) = 0), one real eigenvalue changes sign: it may turn either from positive into negative or vice versa.
Case 4. Finally a generic Hopf bifurcation can take place in the possible interval
Example. In the following numerical example (12) and (20) hold and (k 1 , k 2 ) is divided into three sub-intervals:
is a repellor. Then at k h a Hopf bifurcation occurs and S has a bi-dimensional stable and a one-dimensional unstable manifold for k * ∈ (k h , k 0 ).
Finally, when k * crosses k 0 , a real negative eigenvalue becomes positive and S has a one-dimensional stable and a bi-dimensional unstable manifold as k * ∈ (k 0 , k 2 ).
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Consumption of Private Goods as Substitutes
The example is
In this section we have shown all the Hopf bifurcations which can occur in our model. In Fig. 6 , a locally attractive periodic orbit and one orbit approaching it are plotted . In such a case, given the initial values of k and E [near enough to the projection of the orbit on the (k, E) plane], there exists a continuum of initial values of λ (or, alternatively, of c 1 or c 2 ) by which the economy can reach the periodic orbit. Consequently, an indeterminacy problem occurs. Proof. To this end, let us replace, first, the variables (k, λ, E) in system (7)- (9) by (l, c 1 , E), where l ∈ (0, 1) is defined by (4) Hence we get, after simple steps,
This impliesċ 1 < 0, if
Now assumē
It follows, in particular, as is easily checked, that no equilibrium exists in the c 2 > 0 regime.
Furthermore, consider an orbit starting in the region c 2 > 0, i.e., such that
b . Due to (21) and (22), and since no equilibrium exists when c 2 > 0, there is a time t 1 such that either
If c 2 (t 1 ) > 0, thenĖ(t 1 ) > 0, because of assumptions (23) and (24). Hence E increases, by a speed bounded away from zero, whereas c 1 ≤ c M 1 . Consequently there exists a time t 2 > t 1 such that c 2 (t 2 ) = 0.
Finally, we can chooset,t ≥ t i , i = 1, 2, in such a way that c 1 (t) ≤ c M 1 for t ≥t and c 2 (t) = 0 for t being in some right neighborhood oft (in the particular case α α+d = ε+δ α+δ , the (22) value of c M 1 can be replaced by any slightly larger value). Otherwise, effectively, E would continue to increase, in line with our assumptions, in the region c 2 > 0, until we would obtain
thus contradicting the condition c 2 > 0.
Now it is easily checked that assumptions (23) and (24) imply that, in the c 2 = 0 regime,Ė(t) ≤ 0, t ≥t, requires E(t) to be larger than abc M 1 . However, in this case, the orbit would never cross back the plane ac 1 = E b . Therefore, should the orbit keep crossing such a plane forwards and back , i.e., moving indefinitely from the regime c 2 > 0 to the regime c 2 = 0 and vice versa,Ė(t) would be positive and bounded away from zero as t ≥t, until at some time, in the c 2 > 0 regime,
yielding a contradiction.
Hence we can choose the previoust as the time at which the orbit enters into and then remains in the c 2 = 0 regime.
Conclusions
In order to better evaluate the relevance of the results obtained by our work, it may be useful to bear in mind what the dynamics of economic growth would be if the private good produced in the economy could not be consumed by the economic agents as a self-protection device against the deterioration of the environmental resource. In this case, whatever the values of E and k, the dynamics of the economy would only be described by the dynamics with c 2 = 0, that is there would be at most one fixed point with E > 0 (the fixed point A in Figs. 4 and  5) . The possibility of consuming the private good to alleviate the negative effects deriving from environmental degradation generates considerably more complex dynamics. More specifically, the analysis performed shows that, as well as the fixed point with c 2 = 0, we can also have another three fixed points at which we have c 2 > 0; in these the levels of capital accumulation and consumption are higher than in the fixed point with c 2 = 0.
We have showed that the fixed point with c 2 = 0 exists only if, coeteris paribus, the endowment of the environmental goodĒ is sufficiently high and the negative impact γ of average consumption on the environmental good is sufficiently low; however, the values ofĒ and γ play no role in its stability properties. Furthermore, we have showed that whenĒ is sufficiently high, orbits starting in the region c 2 > 0 enter and remain, after a finite time, in the regime c 2 = 0. Consequently, for high values ofĒ, the dynamics of the economy rule out definitively substitutive consumptions.
WhenĒ is lower, dynamics become more interesting; in particular, bi-stable regimes can occur where the economy may reach the fixed point (or a periodic orbit) where c 2 = 0 or a fixed point (or a periodic orbit) where c 2 > 0 depending on the initial values of E and k. Furthermore, when α + δ > 1, there is the possibility of three reachable fixed points (see remark concerning Subcase 1 in Section 6); for example, it can happen that the fixed point with c 2 = 0 is attractive, the one with E > 0, c 2 > 0 and ψ ′ (k * ) > 0 is a saddle with a bi-dimensional stable manifold and the fixed point satisfying E > 0, c 2 > 0 and ψ ′ (k * ) < 0 is attractive.
The complexity of the scenario described above is enhanced if we consider that indeterminacy can occur; in this case, even economies characterized by identical technologies, preferences and endowments of environmental goods, starting from the same initial values of E and k, may follow different growth dynamics choosing different initial values of λ (the multiplier associated with the state variable k). Note that the dynamics we have analyzed can have an attracting fixed point in the regime c 2 > 0 and a (reachable) saddle point in c 2 = 0; this implies that self-protection choices can cause indeterminacy.
The basic prediction of the model is that if there exist private goods that can be consumed as substitutes for environmental goods, then environmental deterioration may play the role of engine of economic growth. As regards economic agents' welfare, the analysis of the model has demonstrated that there is not necessarily a positive correlation between the level of accumulation of capital (and, consequently, the level of consumption of the private good) and economic agents' welfare. In particular, at the fixed point where capital accumulation is relatively low and c 2 = 0, welfare may be greater than in the other fixed points. Section 7 gives a numerical example where economic growth is undesirable and shows, by another example, that increasing (coeteris paribus) the value of the parameter δ (the exponent of average labour input), desirable economic growth can be obtained. These results are due to the fact that the productive activity of each agent also generates positive externalities on the productive activity of the others; consequently, the level of welfare obtained is the result of the interplay between positive and negative effects deriving from the choices of each agent. In the former example, negative externalities overcome positive externalities; vice versa in the latter.
The basic lesson emerging from the analysis of the model is that the aggregate level of consumption of the private goods is a distorted index of individuals' welfare. This paper suggests that economic growth policies which are capable of achieving their goals, but at high environmental costs, should be treated with great caution. Economic policies ought to guarantee the growth of the values of appropriate welfare indices, which take into consideration not only the level of aggregate consumption but also that of environmental degradation and of selfprotection consumption.
The question which all the public administrators ought to ask themselves is the following: how many opportunities do individuals have at their disposal for enjoying their leisure at no cost? This question acquires particular significance if we consider the problem of the management of the cities. The negative effects caused by the interaction between individuals are in fact particularly evident in densely populated environments, such as the urban areas, which consequently prove to be the places in which most of the self-protective choices are implemented. The cities feature the advantage of offering a wide variety of opportunities for spending leisure; at the same time they also often feature the disadvantage that almost nothing which is on offer can be used without spending money. From this point of view, the measures for reducing urban pollution by blocking traffic during the weekend constitute an example of public intervention that is extremely efficacious, providing an incentive for the citizens to change 29 their models of consumption. By reducing the acoustic and atmospheric pollution, such measures contribute greatly to extending the offer of free access sites where the citizens can enjoy their free time, and therefore contribute to reducing selfprotective consumption. In general, on the basis of the results of our model, it would appear desirable for the public administration to identify and classify all the activities which may generate self-protective consumption, with reference to the types of entity involved (individuals, firms, public sector), the sites in which such activities are carried out and, finally, the possible solutions which can be offered by the public sector. The public administrators are the only entities which can implement efficacious intervention in that, as the model shows, even perfectly rational individuals may select inefficient models of consumption. Hence we arrive at a contradiction. We can conclude that, when ψ ′ (k * ) > 0, J(S) has only one eigenvalue with negative real part, and therefore negative.
